Abstract
Introduction
With the rapid increase of commerce and other online transactions, it has become advantageous to have methods for evaluation of the behavior of agents involved. The notions that address how agents assess other agents, and how overall reputations arise, derive from cognitive social science. The primary reference for this background is the foundational work [1] . Some well-known and widely used systems already give some data to help assess the reputation of an agent. For example, the eBay makes available for each agent the percentage of positive evaluations it receives from other agents, called the "Feedback". The report [6] has a comprehensive survey of many alternative approaches to representing, assessing, computing and updating agent trustworthiness and reputation. This paper is different in spirit of much of the ongoing work on reputation of which [5] is a good example. In [5] the main method for evaluating performance of different approaches is by simulation. Our paper however sets out postulates that are intuitively appealing, and from them we derive representation theorems.
Assume that N agents {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are involved in some pairwise transactions over discrete time instants. We identify time instants with natural numbers and that the "granularity" of time intervals is sufficiently fine so that any two agents at any instant can be involved in at most one transaction. For an agent A i , its assessment of another agent A j for a transaction happened at k is its experience evaluation, e i j (k). Over time up to n, agent A i has produced an experience sequence which we identify with the partial function
is the collection of time instants k ≤ n when agent A i was engaged in a transaction with A j . If there is no confusion, we drop the index i, j for brevity. For every
. This sequence is the base of A i 's judgement of A j 's trustworthiness which can be seen as an aggregation over time of all individual past experiences. We call this trust rank, T ( s ).
For an agent A j , its trust ranks by all other agents in the community can be further aggregated to give a community-wide judgement on its trustworthiness. We call this A j 's reputation, ρ j (n), which is valid at time n. Having a reputation based on just a few transactions long time ago is clearly different from having the same based on a large number of recent transactions. To ad-dress this issue, we introduce the notion of community evidence, W j (n), for each ρ j (n).
In our approach, these two levels of aggregation are performed by a central mediating agency to minimize bias in the aggregation process. In addition to being more robust against manipulative reporting, this system also maintains the privacy of the evaluations of individual transactions.
Fair conditions, also called rationality assumptions, that constrain how an experience sequence is related to the consequent trustworthiness assessment have been investigated in [4] and [2] . We provide a rigorous analysis of the problem of ranking the trustworthiness and reputation of agents involved in transactions, and in assessing reliability of such a rank, based on our rationality assumptions. While these persuasive assumptions are essential to our analysis, much of our technical development can be modified for somewhat different setups that do not meet all of our assumptions.
Aggregation in Time
We will assume that an experience evaluation e(k) is a real number in a fixed range [0, M], M > 0. If e(k) = M, this means A i regards the quality of the transaction with A j at moment k is the best, while a report of 0 means the worst. Now, let us list axioms which delineate the "rationality" of trust rank T .
Axioms for Aggregation in Time
(T1) Shift Invariance. Let s + be the forward unit shift of the sequence s , i.e., let
(T2) Time Averaging. Let s be any sequence of experiences; then min(
(T3) Consistency. Let s 1 and s 2 be two experience
(T4) Discounting. Assume that 0 ≤ e < E ≤ M and let
We feel that every reasonable trust rank function must satisfy the above axioms. Intuitive justification of the next axiom given below is perhaps somewhat less than universal; however, it greatly simplifies technical matters, without imposing any undue restrictions.
(T5) Linearity. Let α, β be real numbers, and s 1 ,
The next lemma reveals a form for trust rank functions analogous to the response of a linear system. 
Proof. For each k ∈ D, we define the experience se-
Theorem 2.2 (Representation Theorem) Let T satisfy the axioms; then there exists q ≥ 1 such that for all s the following canonical representation of T ( s ) holds:
Proof. Note that, by Lemma 2.1, for some w 
We define s mm ′ as follow: (1 + r) . We define s 1n as follow:
Then again by T2 and T3, T (
which is easily seen to yield r = q n−1 . This means that for every s such that D( s ) = {1, n} we have 
Theorem 2.3 (Trust Update) Let function Q(D) be defined on finite sets of natural numbers so that Q(D) = ∑ i∈D q i ; let n > max(D( s )) and s
′ = s ∪ {(n, e(n))}. Then T ( s ′ ) = Q(D( s )) T ( s ) Q(D( s )) + q n−1 + q n−1 e(n) Q(D( s )) + q n−1 .
Proof. By Theorem 2.2 we have
To obtain the new values, T ( s ′ ) and Q(D( s ′ )), we only need to keep track of two quantities, T ( s ) and Q(D( s )), rather than the whole evaluation history.
As q increases, the dependency of the trust rank on most recent samples also increases, i.e., the value of q controls how fast the trust rank updates. The proper value for q should be chosen close to but larger than one, on the basis of statistical data from the community of agents involved, matching the expected volatility of agents and striking the right balance between importance of longer term performance and likelihood of sudden changes in agent's behavior.
Aggregation in Community
To handle the issues about community reputation, we first introduce a notion of the weight of pairwise evidence, denoted by w i j (n). Let s i j (n) be a sequence up to time n we define
where q is the same constant as in (2.2). In essence, we count the number of transactions of A i with A j , discounting each transaction by the factor 1/q n−k where k ∈ D( s i j (n)). In this way, the larger the value of w i j (n) the more significant and reliable the value T ( s i j ) is at an instant n. Note that w i j satisfies the recursion:
Thus, w i j can also be evaluated recursively. Let s i j = max(D( s i j )) − min(D( s i j )) + 1; for q = 1 we have w(n) ≤ n, and for q > 1, w i j (n) are bounded because
. Let ∆ j (n) denote the set of indices of all agents with which agent A j has had transactions up to the instant n. A j 's reputation rank, ρ j (n), should be a form of an average over the community of agents in the sense that min{T (
The influence of a trust assessment T ( s i j (n)) on ρ j (n) should depend on both the interaction significance, w i j (n), and the assessor's reputation, ρ i (n). The following formula of weighted average satisfies all the above criteria:
is the scaling function which is strictly increasing in both arguments and satisfies w, ρ ≤ f (w, ρ). Note that the above does not solve our problem of assigning reputation rank. To solve this problem we look for a solution of the following system of equations in variables ρ i , i ≤ N.
where ρ i (n), i ≤ N are chosen to be the solutions. For our numerical experiment using f (w, ρ) = w α ρ β with positive real numbers α, β depending on discounting factor q, we made an inessential change to possible range of our experience estimates e i j (n), allowing only values 1 ≤ e i j (n) ≤ M, with M >> 1. We set 1 ≤ e i j (n) ≤ 100. Then, by our Averaging axiom, also the values T ( s i j (n)) are in the same range. Consider now the mapping F given by
Since for every j the weights in the weighted j th sum add up to one and f is continuous in both variables, F is a continuous mapping of the N-dimensional cube [1, M] N into itself. As [1, M] N is a convex and compact subset of R N , F must have a fixed point by the Brouwer Fixed point theorem , see e.g., [3] . The fixed point can be obtained by standard iterative procedures. Our experimental results showed that the method is both fast and numerically robust. Finally, we can evaluate the community evidence
Thus, at each moment n and for each j ≤ N, ρ j (n) is a representation and an estimate for our informal notion of community reputation of agent A j , and W j (n) is a community based measure of reliability of such reputation estimate.
Given two agents, one with reputation of 50 and community evidence of 0.5 and another with reputation of 60 and community evidence of 0.4, which should be chosen? The answer depends on the characteristics of the community and must be probabilistic in nature, in the sense that agents will act so that they maximize the expected utility. This problem requires further investigation, similarly to other software engineering issues such as resetting the time sequence count without disruption and partitioning of the market into overlapping sub-communities.
Conclusion
Tennenholtz's [7] idea on the reputation of agents can be paraphrased as follows. Say an agent A j is supported by a set S j of other agents if the agents in S j provide high trust rankings for A j . Since his discussion is about a static domain there is no notion of time progression. Moreover, he argued that support by agents which themselves have high reputations should result in higher reputation for the supported agent than support by low reputation agents. We feel that we have provided an adequate and rigorous formalization of this idea, also extending Tennenholtz's static setup to one that involves time sequences of transactions.
